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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

14 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Contemporary Military
Strategy and Tactics


1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article attempts to cover the entire sphere of strategy and tactics on the contemporary battlefield. The article provides a characterization of modern combat, both nuclear and conventional, including definitions of standard terms in a modern context. Increased movement speeds and greater range of fire are new factors which the author recognizes. He concedes that Soviet forces may have to assume a defensive posture at least temporarily in a future conflict. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (90) for 1970.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR

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DATE OF INFO. Mid-1970

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SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Modern Theory of Tactics and Some of Its Problems

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (90) for 1970 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Major of Tank Troops P. Gudz, who attempts to cover the entire sphere of strategy and tactics on the contemporary battlefield. The article provides a characterization of modern combat, both nuclear and conventional, including definitions of standard terms in a modern context. Increased movement speeds and greater range of fire are new factors which the author recognizes. He concedes that Soviet forces may have to assume a defensive posture at least temporarily in a future conflict.

End of Summary

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Comment:

Gen.-Major Gudz has written several articles on effective training of troops and about the curriculum of the Academy of the Armored Troops i/n Marshal SU R. Ya. Malinovsky, the most recent appearing in Voyenny Vestnik, No. 1, 1968 and Nedelya, No. 37, 1971. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions in the past -- TOP SECRET, SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is published three times annually and is distributed down to the level of division commander.

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The Modern Theory of Tactics and Some of Its Problems

by
General-Major of Tank Troops P. Gudz,
Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor

Tactics, as a component part of military art, is the study of the theory and practice of combat of subunits, units, and large units. Historically, its role has kept changing and has depended on the level attained in the development of production, the means and methods of conducting armed combat, and the position and importance of combat within tactics.

The development of the theory of tactics is strongly influenced by strategy and operational art. They present specific requirements, stemming from the general tasks of achieving victory in war, for increasing the combat readiness of tactical large units, for using their combat capabilities, and for perfecting their methods of conducting combat actions. Moreover, by using the missile/nuclear means at their disposal, strategy and operational art can achieve significant results in the conduct of war and can directly influence the conditions and methods of fulfillment of missions by tactical large units and units. Operational art, determining the method of routing a specific enemy grouping, will pose the tasks for large units and units of arms of troops and coordinate their efforts to attain operational goals. At the same time, tactics, the capabilities of its combat means and the developed methods of conducting combat, in their turn, affect the accomplishment of the tasks of operational art.

Thanks to the concerns of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government for a comprehensive increase in the defensive might of our homeland, new successes have been achieved in recent years in developing all types of armament. Strategic and operational nuclear means have been created, causing fundamental changes in the forms of strategic and operational actions of the armed forces in war. Tactical means have acquired a new quality. There has been a sharp

increase in the maximum and average speeds of movement of the main models of combat and special equipment, while the running time between refuelings is more than twice that of equivalent models, existing at the end of World War II. The effective fire range against the enemy, including that of tank weapons, has increased by a factor of 1.5 to 2; a salvo by a combined-arms large unit has increased by a factor of 1.5 over the past ten years.

The adoption, by large units, of nuclear/missile weaponry and new types of armored and special equipment creates a new materiel base for conducting a battle, increases its territorial scale and dynamism, and raises the importance of the battle in achieving the goals of modern operations. All of this presents a series of new problems for the theory of tactics, problems concerning both increasing combat readiness and perfecting the methods of organizing and conducting a battle.

Victory in a modern battle is achieved through the coordinated efforts of all arms of troops, in conformity with objectively applicable and constantly evolving rules. Thus, the general rules of battle which have been perceived on the basis of material dialectics constitute the initial theoretical bases for the tactics of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Tactics investigates the essence and nature of modern battle and the capabilities of the means with which it is waged and determines ways to increase combat readiness and to wage a battle with the coordinated efforts of units and large units of the arms of troops of all branches of the armed forces. Examining the combat capabilities of units and large units, the theory of tactics determines their tasks in battle, methods for fulfilling tasks, and ways of achieving success through combined efforts, and establishes the role of the various means of destruction, strike, and maneuver in battle, the procedure for supporting and maintaining high combat readiness and combat effectiveness, methods of control, the requirements for the organizational structure of the troops and for future models of their combat and special equipment, and methods for troop combat training and the organization of all types of support.


The combat characteristics and capabilities of the different arms of troops of the armed forces branches enable their large units and units to carry out specific tasks in battle only with their own characteristic methods. The difference in the conduct of combat actions in combined-arms, naval, or air battles has caused a need for the existence of tactics for each branch of the armed forces. Each branch of the armed forces has those means affording its units and large units the capability to wage battle and to support the combat actions of its forces. Those large units and units whose basis is their means of waging battle, form the arms of troops; units and subunits whose basis is their means for support, form the special troops. Accordingly, the tactics of each branch of the armed forces are subdivided into the tactics of the arms of troops and the theory of support of combat actions.

The present structure of the theory of tactics satisfies the objectively developing conduct of battle and makes possible the thorough and comprehensive working out of the methods of combat use of the arms of troops of the branches of the armed forces. At the same time, it is completely obvious that as a result of further changes in the conditions under which combat actions are conducted, particularly following the introduction of new combat means, there will also be new branches of the theory of modern tactics and further development of existing branches. In the near future, one should expect the appearance and formation of such new branches of the theory of tactics as radio-electronic combat to neutralize systems of control for troops and complex types of armament, and the combat use of laser means, modeling of battle, etc.

One of the fundamental problems of modern military art *
is to find ways of ensuring high combat readiness;
successful use of large units of the arms of troops in accordance with their designation in the initial operations depends upon the correct solution of this problem. Experience shows that as the means of armed conflict develop and cause changes in our views on methods for the preparation, development, and conduct of combat actions, requirements for the level of combat readiness of the arms of troops will increase.

Research on the nature of possible military conflicts and methods of unleashing military actions has shown that, in order to provide for permanent readiness of tactical large units in peacetime and for their rapid transition to readiness to conduct combat actions, it is advisable to have several states of combat readiness. This will make it possible to bring large units and units to readiness for carrying out their assigned combat tasks in accordance with their designation, within the time limits determined by the Minister of Defense of the USSR. However, considering the perfidious intentions of the aggressors, especially the concept of "strategic initiative", we must, in solving the problems of improving the combat readiness of troops, proceed from the most complicated and unfavorable conditions under which troops may have to be brought immediately to full combat readiness. Finding ways to reduce the time needed to bring large units to full combat readiness is therefore the most fundamental problem of the theory of tactics in this field at the present stage. The first-priority tasks here will be: further research on the states of combat readiness and the bulk of measures taken for each of them in large units and units of the arms of troops and of special troops; the development and introduction of more modern methods for notifying, assembling, and moving out large units to the areas of their combat assignment; determination of ways to increase the survivability of large units and units under the conditions of initiated military actions; and introduction of new methods for locating and protecting combat and special equipment and mobile reserves, which would ensure their preservation and use without complicated demobbing.

In determining the nature and methods of conducting combat actions, Soviet military art proceeds from the premise that a future war, if the imperialists should attempt to unleash one, will be a decisive clash between two social systems--the capitalist and the socialist. It will be strictly a class war, will have pronounced political goals, and will be waged with the use of the latest means of combat, all of which will exert a decisive influence on the nature and methods of combat actions. In a nuclear war, groupings of troops will suffer considerable losses; control organs and militarily important objectives will be subjected to powerful strikes; and great areas of destruction and radioactive contamination will be formed. Under such conditions, combined-arms large units which have preserved



or restored their combat effectiveness will begin, in accordance with the concept of the contemplated operations, to effect the rout of surviving enemy groupings and seize his territory. With this, the presence of gaps, between enemy large units and units and areas not occupied by his troops, create conditions for the conduct of offensive actions by combined-arms large units on axes along a wide front, at rapid speeds and to a great depth, and for the rapid accomplishment of maneuver on the field of battle to deliver an attack on the flanks and rear of the enemy and defeat him piecemeal. *

In a non-nuclear war, if one arises, it will be difficult, using only conventional strike means, to inflict significant losses on groupings of enemy troops within a short period of time. Therefore, the basic method of achieving the goals of operations will be successive destruction of enemy groupings in the theater. Combat actions will take place under conditions of a constant threat of the use of means of mass destruction, which makes it necessary to work out new methods of organizing and conducting a battle.

The resoluteness of purpose of the warring sides, the concentration of the main groupings of combined-arms large units along the axes, and increased capabilities, for maneuver by forces and means will increase the probability that meeting engagements will arise, especially with wide use of nuclear weapons. In this respect, tactics regards meeting engagements as an independent form of combat actions, in which the organizational problems of creation of the grouping of forces and means are resolved by the two sides as they approach each other; units go into combat directly from the march, in their pre-combat formations, and carry out their tasks by mounting aggressive meeting strikes. *

Meeting engagements of motorized rifle and tank large units under present conditions will take the form of decisive single combat with an equal, and in many cases superior, enemy grouping. It becomes particularly important, therefore, to find ways of mounting sudden preemptive strikes on the enemy during his approach and deployment and of achieving superiority on the main axis. *



The highly dynamic and decisive nature of meeting engagements enables our large units to show their maneuver capabilities more fully, in order to achieve timely exploitation of strikes by nuclear weapons, aviation, and artillery. There is no doubt that in meeting engagements in the future, along with wide use of such established methods of actions as holding the main enemy grouping in front with part of our forces and delivering attacks on the flank and rear of it with our main forces, it will be possible more often to deliver a frontal attack to cut up the enemy grouping into units and accomplish its rout within a short time.

Modern motorized rifle and tank large units are able, by the rapid maneuvering of two or three regiments to deliver attacks on the enemy's flank and rear, or by a slashing attack, to achieve on the main axis the superiority in tanks and artillery which is necessary for success. As shown by combat training experience and computer calculations, tank and motorized rifle divisions can succeed in routing the main forces of an enemy division to the whole depth of its combat formation (up to 30 kilometers), using either nuclear weapons or conventional means of destruction. Therefore, it is quite obvious that it is advisable to specify single combat tasks for our divisions in meeting engagements, i.e. an immediate task and an axis of further advance. Thus, the immediate task of a division may be to rout the main forces of an opposing enemy division and take over territory to a depth of 25 to 30 kilometers.

The rates at which the enemy is routed in meeting engagements will be highly unequal. Research shows that before the delivery of a strike on the main mass of enemy tanks and infantry with nuclear strikes and fire from all means, the rates of advance of attacking units on the main axis and on the axis of attack against the flank and rear may reach 4 to 6 kilometers per hour, increasing to 8 to 10 kilometers per hour upon achievement of a rout.

The high (but unequal) rates of approach of the two sides in actions anticipating meeting engagements, and the increased capabilities for rapid changes of direction of movement and concentration of main efforts, require a new approach to choosing the movement of delivery of the preemptive strike with nuclear weapons and with the main forces of a division. The delivery of preemptive fire

strikes on an advancing enemy grouping must be started with aviation and missiles immediately upon detection of his columns. When the columns of the enemy's main forces begin to deploy in combat formation, the main efforts of our troops must be concentrated on destroying newly detected means of nuclear attack and tank subunits. We must take into account that with the delivery of fire strikes against an advancing enemy grouping, the knocking out of his main means of destruction, the disruption of his main strike grouping as an integral force, the destruction of his control points, and the creation of centers of total destruction along the routes of movement, there will be a substantial increase in the possibilities for forestalling the enemy in the deployment of his main forces and in their initiation of an attack. This will create favorable conditions for cutting up the opposing grouping into units and routing them individually within a short time.

If the situation is developing unfavorably for the enemy, his large units may go over to the defensive on a number of axes. The Soviet theory of tactics has always allotted great attention to attacking an enemy on the defensive. As a result of numerous research projects and experimental exercises, a clear-cut system of views on methods of organizing and conducting an offensive has been worked out. This system is set forth in the most condensed form in current regulations, guides, and manuals. However, the changes which have taken place in recent years in the conditions and capabilities for routing an enemy on the defensive require new solutions for a number of problems.


In recent years, the methods used by combined-arms large units in transition to the offensive have been developed further and have become more varied. According to the nature of the organization of combat and the methods of creating groupings of forces and means and of transition to the offensive, we may distinguish three methods: direct from the march with deployment from the march, in which the organizing of the offensive, the creation of the necessary grouping of troops, and the fire strike on the enemy all take place during the period of moving out to the forward edge of the battle area; from the march with previous preparation, in which reconnaissance, the adoption of decisions, assignments of tasks, organization of cooperation, and the most vital measures for supporting combat all take place before the troops begin to move

forward from the areas they have been occupying (assembly areas, areas for concentration on alert status, and sites of permanent deployment), and the creation of the grouping of troops, according to the concept of the battle, and the fire strike on the enemy are done at the time large units are moving forward toward the enemy defense; and from direct contact with the enemy after the necessary regrouping of forces and means has been completed.

With these methods of transition to the offensive, combined-arms large units can deliver: a slashing attack, with development into the depth and expansion toward the flanks; an attack with maneuver for encirclement of the main grouping of defending troops in cooperation with the adjacent division; an attack by tank and motorized rifle units from the front and by airborne landing forces (air-assault units) from the rear; and finally, when there are gaps in the enemy's defensive formation, an attack on the flank and rear of his main forces with a simultaneous exploitation of success into the depth.

In an offensive against a defending enemy, as distinct from a meeting engagement, it is possible to make a more exact advance determination of tasks for large units and units. In connection with the fact that when the enemy occupies defenses on a specific line, the front and depth of the defense remain of more or less constant dimensions for a certain period of time, it is advisable to assign motorized rifle and tank large units the same (in tactical content) combat tasks, both under conditions of an offensive with conventional means of destruction and with the use of nuclear weapons, but with consideration for the combat capabilities of these large units and the specific circumstances.

On the basis of calculations of the combat capabilities of combined-arms large units, it may be asserted that the most optimal width for the offensive front of a division is a zone of up to 15 kilometers. In this zone, for example, when an enemy mechanized or motorized infantry division is defending a front of up to 30 kilometers, a tank division of ours (counting only the first echelon) can attain a twofold superiority in tanks and be equal to the enemy in infantry, while a motorized rifle division of ours can have an approximately twofold superiority in infantry and be equal to the the enemy in tanks. When the main efforts of a



division are concentrated on breaking through enemy defense in two sectors (with an average width of 6 to 7 kilometers), our superiority in forces and means in those sectors will become about twice as great. It follows from this that a tank division is capable of routing an enemy on the defensive to the full depth of his divisional combat formation, without calling in forces and means of the second echelon, but a motorized rifle division (after advancing to the depth of the enemy's brigade reserves) will be required to call in additional forces from the second echelon to rout the divisional reserves. Consequently, the breakthrough of the enemy defense to the depth of first-echelon brigades will comprise the immediate task of a motorized rifle division, while the breakthrough of the enemy defense to the full depth of the enemy divisional combat formation will be the subsequent task. For a tank division, however, the breakthrough of defenses to the full depth of the enemy divisional combat formation will comprise the immediate task. This is in accord not only with the combat capabilities of a tank division but also with the principles of their use in modern operations. A tank division, as a rule, will be used on main axes, on which the resources of the senior commanding officer will also be used to neutralize the enemy, and this will create the necessary prerequisites for it to carry out deeper tasks. *

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When only conventional weapons are used in conducting an offensive, a division will effect a breakthrough of the defense in one sector, concentrating its main forces here at the time of the breakthrough. Calculations show that it is most advantageous to carry out a breakthrough on a front not exceeding 4 kilometers. In this case, a tank division which has concentrated the main forces of only its first echelon for the breakthrough may achieve a fivefold to sixfold superiority in tanks and a twofold superiority in infantry, while a motorized rifle division may achieve respectively, a threefold to fourfold superiority. According to the experience of World War II, such superiority assured a successful breakthrough of the defense. Regarding the density of artillery, it has recently been concluded, on the basis of theoretical calculations, experimental training exercises, and the application of new methods of solving fire tasks, that 80 to 100 or more guns and mortars are needed for each kilometer of the breakthrough sector. However, these questions



require further research and testing in the course of experimental exercises.

* The speeds at which a defending enemy is routed depend on the degree of his destruction by nuclear weapons or conventional means, the method of attack of tanks and infantry, the level of preparation of our troops, and the extent to which the defenders resist. Experience shows that in breaking through positions and defended areas along axes on which the enemy has been heavily neutralized, the rate of advance may reach 6 to 8 kilometers per hour when infantry in combat vehicles attack jointly with tanks and may reach 8 to 12 kilometers per hour in areas between positions. However, if the situation is such that the infantry is attacking on foot, the overall rate of advance may be cut in half.

The methods of organizing an attack on a defending enemy depend on the specific conditions. The method of transition to the attack will exert a considerable influence. At the present time, there has been a sufficiently thorough working out of the methods of work of commanders and staffs in organizing an attack "from the march with planned preparation" and from a position of direct contact with the enemy. As regards the organizing of an attack from the march, the creation of a grouping of forces and means in accordance with the concept of operations, and the methods for mounting fire strikes against the enemy and transition to the attack, a thorough and comprehensive working out of these questions is one of the most important tasks of the theory of tactics.

* After the breakthrough of the enemy defense, tank and motorized rifle large units will develop the attack swiftly. The rates of advance of motorized rifle large units may reach 30 to 40 kilometers in 24 hours when the defenses have been broken through, and 50 to 60 kilometers when the attack is developed in depth and when the circumstances are favorable; the corresponding figures for tank large units are 40 to 50 kilometers and 60 to 80 kilometers in 24 hours.

As the results of current research show, an offensive in operational depth of the enemy formation will begin to develop along the axes and over wide zones. Combat actions under these conditions will be characterized by irregularity of troop advance and by the conduct of wide maneuvering of

forces and means, and they will grow into a resolute pursuit of the retreating enemy in order to quickly complete his rout. A unity of views has been attained in the field of tactics regarding methods for destroying nuclear strike means, forcing rivers, pursuing, destroying control points, and negotiating zones of destruction and radioactive contamination. It has been demonstrated theoretically and confirmed with troop combat training that such tasks as destruction and capture of enemy nuclear strike means, forcing of water obstacles, destruction of large control points, and seizing important areas can be carried out by combined-arms large units without reducing the rates of advance; a retreating enemy may be pursued at a rate of 12 to 15 kilometers per hour. *

It follows from the nature of modern operations that in achieving their goals, combined-arms large units will have to conduct combat actions in areas in which strategic nuclear means are being used, especially under conditions of the wide use of means of mass destruction. The specific nature of the situation in these areas (great devastation, zones in which there are flooding and high levels of radioactive contamination, deployment of troops only in the most important sectors) will require that modern tactics find suitable operations methods for large units and a procedure for their cooperation with rocket troops, aircraft and airborne units.

Another very urgent problem is the comprehensive development of methods for large units and units to negotiate flooded areas, straits, and bays. The capabilities of combined-arms large units (especially tank large units) for carrying out such tasks have increased substantially during recent years, and using them skilfully will make it possible to carry combat operations into areas set off by water barriers without diminishing the rapid development of an offensive.

One of the most vital problems in the theory of modern combat is to work out methods of transition from an offensive using only conventional strike means to combat operations using nuclear weapons. In resolving this problem, it is of first-priority importance to determine ways of preempting an enemy nuclear strike and of timely maneuvering of our units and subunits in order to get them out from under an enemy nuclear strike. This can be



X achieved by correct organization of reconnaissance, destruction of enemy nuclear strike means as soon as they are detected, maintaining the readiness of missile battalions for the immediate use of nuclear warheads and of attacking units for the timely exploitation of the results of the nuclear strikes, and finally continuous implementation of purposeful measures for protection of the troops.

X Practical resolution of the problem of transition from non-nuclear to nuclear actions involves a review of the methods being used in organizing combat with only conventional strike means. As already indicated, it has become necessary to change the procedure for assigning tasks to large units. As far as tactical content is concerned, it is advisable to assign the same tasks, in non-nuclear operations as in nuclear but to establish different timing and a different grouping of forces and means for their fulfillment.

* In an offensive using conventional strike means, the concentration of superior forces on the main axis must be proportional to the size of the directly attacking units and must be done only at the time of the attack. The second echelons and reserves must be deployed in such a way as to provide for intensification of the efforts of the attacking troops at the required time and, with the transition to nuclear actions, for delivering attacks on new axes. Essentially new in the work of commanders is the task of determining the possible methods of transition to nuclear operations and the practical measures to be taken for its support.

Stemming from the requirements of operational art, a well-formed theory of defensive combat has also been developed.

The essence of defense as a form of combat operations is shown in its goals and the methods of achieving them. Since it is impossible to achieve complete victory over an enemy by means of defense, defense is placed in a subordinate category to offense. The ultimate goal of defense in all circumstances must therefore be the preparation of favorable conditions for decisive offensive operations. The realization of this basic goal presupposes creating defenses capable of repulsing an offensive by




superior enemy forces, inflicting significant losses on them, and holding important areas which have been occupied.

The nature of defense is influenced by many factors, among which the capabilities and operating methods of the attacking enemy are of decisive importance. It is obvious that the enemy will strive to attain his goals through aggressive actions, making use of nuclear and conventional weapons, airborne landings, and airmobile forces. Accordingly, on those axes on which he succeeds in creating a significant superiority of forces and in assuming the offensive or mounting counterstrikes, some of our large units will be compelled to go on the defensive temporarily, even in the midst of an offensive operation. Defensive operations may accordingly take place not only on secondary axes but also on main axes, and may occur either at the beginning of a war or during it. In addition, they must be coordinated and able to resist an enemy offensive regardless of whether nuclear weapons or only conventional means of destruction are employed.

In examining the structure of a modern defense, we must keep in mind that in many of the armies of our probable enemies self-propelled artillery has become the most massive means of using tactical nuclear weapons, a means capable of inflicting substantial losses within a short time. For this reason it is advisable to place the main forces of a defending division outside the range of its fire. It accordingly appears necessary to increase the depth of a division defense zone to 25 to 30 kilometers and to build combat structures in such a way that two adjacent platoon strongpoints cannot be simultaneously destroyed by a single nuclear warhead with a very low yield. By the same consideration, we must expect an increase in the role and significance of the security zone and the forward position.

* As regards the width of the front of a division defense zone, calculations confirm the advisability of retaining the existing norms, i.e., for large units defending on a main axis, the front may be up to 30 kilometers wide. In this case, allowing for the factors which determine the antitank effectiveness of the various means, a system of antitank fire can be created which will make it possible to repulse an enemy attack with an average density of up to 15 tanks or, on main axes, up to 30 tanks per kilometer of front. *



A critical new factor for troop operations is represented by adverse chemical and radiation conditions, wide zones of devastation and areas of contamination, fires, and obstructions. Under these conditions, especially in areas of strikes by strategic nuclear means, a division defense zone may be considerably larger, while the defense itself assumes the sharply defined characteristics of individual centers.

At the present time it is impossible to count on a successful defense without continuous and aggressive combat against enemy means of air attack, combat which has acquired new substance, namely to repulse raids by aircraft and pilotless means and combat with enemy airborne landings and airmobile forces. This increases the role of coordinated actions by all means in striking both ground and air targets, and in many instances it also appears advisable to create a special anti-landing reserve.

The most important task of the theory of tactics under modern conditions is to find ways of further increasing the stability of defense, first of all of its basic element, antitank defense. Great importance is ascribed to the skilful use of helicopters armed with antitank means and of units and subunits of tank-destroyers, antitank guided missiles, and flame-thrower and incendiary means.

The entry of combined-arms large units into combat will be preceded by moves, including some over long distances. An analysis of the capabilities of the combat and special equipment now in use shows that, under good road conditions, motorized rifle and tank large units can advance over great distances by their own means at an average rate of about 250 to 300 kilometers a day, without any appreciable loss of their combat effectiveness for conducting offensive operations. With the introduction into combined-arms large units of new forms of combat and special equipment, the rate of moves will increase by at least 50 to 100 kilometers a day. For short marches, the distance covered in a day may be even greater.

In the interests of full exploitation of the capabilities of large units to advance to their assigned combat areas on time and to assure that they are organized upon entering into combat, the theory of tactics is called upon to resolve a series of pressing problems.



Specifically, it is necessary to conduct comprehensive research on methods of maintaining high combat readiness among combined-arms large units advancing by the combined method to enable them to make an organized entry into combat in case the railroads and railroad stations should be destroyed, particularly if the enemy delivers nuclear strikes and sets up nuclear barriers. For meaningful theoretical development and practical testing, we must establish working methods for commanders and staffs under the conditions being discussed here, as well as criteria for evaluating the combat effectiveness of personnel and of all types of combat and special equipment. In connection with the projected development mentioned in transport aircraft, there is also great interest in working out methods for airdropping combined-arms large units.

If, in long-distance moves, large units set up their march formations in their rear with due consideration for facilitating the completion of the march and the achievement of high rates of speed, for the maximum protection of forces, and for the maintenance of constant readiness to repulse enemy air strikes and airborne landings, then the grouping of forces and means, upon proceeding to its assigned combat area, will already be set up in accord with the plan for the impending operation. Moreover, as indicated by combat training experience, especially by the results of the largest exercises of recent years, even though our present theoretical concepts do make basic provision for the organized deployment of large units and their entry into combat, many problems still require new solutions.

Above all, it has become apparent that we must reduce the time required to deploy large units for entry into combat. The most important ways of solving this problem are a sharp increase in the average rates of speed of subunits (including mixed columns) and a reduction in the distance between subunits and units. Thus, by reducing the distance between battalions to 3 kilometers and between regiments to 5 kilometers, the total time for deploying large units into combat formation can be reduced by a factor of almost two. *

Another very urgent problem is that of increasing the rates of speed at which subunits and units move directly to the field of battle so that they can carry out an envelopment or an outflanking maneuver, or move from one

axis to another in order to intensify the efforts there or to advance into a new area. Since combined-arms large units today rely on a large amount of combat and special equipment, the correct resolution of the problems of technical, materiel, and other types of support has become exceedingly important.

The intensive development of combat and special equipment and the large-scale equipping of troops with it, and the consequent increase in the mobility, dynamism, and diversity of combat operations, have a substantial effect on the methods and procedures of controlling troops at tactical levels.

At present the preparation and organization of combat are carried out in as short a time as possible, and under rapidly and abruptly changing conditions. Under such circumstances troop control is characterized by exceptional efficiency in all control processes, by the implementation of control over units and large units throughout a large area, by a maximum display of initiative by all commanders within the framework of the plan of the senior commander and of the mission to be fulfilled, and by the necessity for a scientific prediction of the course combat actions will take. Firmness, continuity, and flexibility have acquired even greater importance in troop control in modern combat.

The complexity of combat conditions substantially increases the role of personal leadership of troops by commanders and requires that they have exceptional initiative, comprehensive professional knowledge, and the ability to analyze a situation thoroughly, to correctly determine how to achieve victory, and to make sound decisions. Commanders must react to all changes in a situation as rapidly as possible, within seconds or minutes. Calculations and training exercises indicate that during combat operations, 30 to 40 minutes are required by large units for the receipt of situation data, the formulation of a decision based on the data, and the assignment of tasks; while 15 to 20 minutes are required by units. Thus, the theory of tactics is faced with the very important task of working out requirements for structural plans of control, for providing the necessary means for these plans, and for determining, on the basis of these two factors, new operating methods to be used by commanders and staffs in troop control. And it has now become very important to

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eliminate, as quickly as possible, the lag in control means, and in the control methods based on these means, that exists in comparison with the growing combat capabilities of units and large units.

It is obvious that the conformity of control methods with troop capabilities can increase substantially with the introduction of radio sets which operate reliably under jamming conditions and which automatically provide secure conversations; with the development and assimilation of a system for collecting and processing information according to its prospective use and importance; with the development of more efficient forms for combat documents; and with the adoption of new reconnaissance means and navigation equipment. Furthermore, the projected means must, to the greatest extent possible, free commanders and staff officers from "information work" and allow them more time for situation analysis, the making of sound decisions, and leadership of their troops in battle.

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